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APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Citing Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co.. 2003 UT 8,1f 20, 70 P.3d 1, the Utah
Supreme Court in 2008 UTSC 20060986 - 020508, Bowman v. Kalm declared:
^( 6 When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party." Utah Golf Ass'n v. City ofN. Salt Lake,
2003 UT38, U 10, 79 P.3d 919 (citation omitted). "We grant no deference to the
district court's conclusions of law and review them for correctness."
However, in rendering its decision in this matter, this court completely ignored its
obligation under Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co. and Bowman v. Kalm. as well as other
clear and controlling Utah law, specifying an appellate court's duty in reviewing an
appeal of a grant of summary judgment, and viewed all disputed facts in the light most
favorable to Superior, drew all inferences, whether reasonable or not, in a light most
favorable to Superior and made prohibited factual findings of its own.

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT VIEWED THE FACTS OF THIS CASE IN A LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO SUPERIOR, WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THIS COURT ALSO MADE FACTUAL
FINDINGS ON APPEAL AND PROJECTED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
INTO THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISIONS, WHICH THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT MAKE, AND THEN, THIS COURT AFFIRMED THOSE NONE EXISTENT
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
A. THE DIFFERENT AMOUNTS SPECIFIED IN SUPERIOR'S COMPLAINT.
AND ITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS. CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT AS TO HOW MUCH. IF ANY MR. PETT MAY OWE.
This court is not only wrong in its improper factual conclusion, contained in f 3 of
its memorandum decision, that different amounts specified in Superior's complaint and
supporting documents do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to how much, if
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any, Mr. Pett owes Interwest, the court's math used making that improper factual
conclusion, is simply wrong, and this court is not entitled to make factual conclusions on
appeal.1
This court incorrectly and improperly makes the factual conclusion that the
difference between the $572.00 Superior asked for in its complaint and the $627.00 it was
awarded on summary judgment is due to finance charges on the $572.00. However, if the
entries for finance charges on Mr. Pett's "Patient Ledger Analysis, " (hereinafter, "the
Ledger") are totaled, the amount is $63.12, not the $55.00 the court incorrectly and
improperly concludes is interest on the $572.00. This court's improper factual
conclusion that the difference between the amount specified in Superior's complaint of
$627.00 and the $572.00, it claims it is owed, in Gittins affidavit, is due to interest on the
principal charge of $572.00, is simply wrong and so is this court's math.
Under the facts of this case, and given the limited amount of evidence Superior has
provided, it is impossible to determine how much, if any, Mr. Pett owes Interwest, and
Interwest's own documents undeniably create a genuine issue of material fact as to how
much, if any, Mr. Pett owes Interwest. Therefore, this court was wrong in making its
improper and incorrect factual conclusion that:
the different amounts did not create a genuine issue of fact because they merely
reflected the account balance at different points in time and did not affect the total
amount due at the time of judgment.

1. The trial court could not, and did not, make the factual finding that the difference
between the amount prayed for in Superior's complaint and the amount Interwest claimed
Mr. Pett owed in its supporting documents was due to accumulated interest, and this court
can not do so on appeal. (Record at 73, 94, 102-106).
-2-

If, however, this court is going to make factual conclusions, at the very least it
should explain how it reached its factual conclusions. This court should explain how it
concluded that $55.00 is equivalent to $63.12 and how it computed the alleged finance
charges to arrive at its $55.00 figure.2
This court should not just make factual conclusions without explaining how it
allegedly arrived at those factual conclusions, even if it were permitted to make factual
conclusions, which it is not. This court can only review the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for correctness. It cannot make independent factual findings, that are
not contained in the trial court's decision. The trial court never concluded that the
difference between the $572.00 Superior asked for in its complaint and the $627.00 it was
awarded on summary judgment was due to interest charges on the $572.00. Therefore, as
a matter of law, this court cannot make the factual finding that the difference between the
$572.00 Superior asked for in its complaint and the $627.00 it was awarded on summary
judgment was due to interest charges on the $572.00, or hold that such a conclusion, the
trial court never made, is correct.
B. THE COURT WAS WRONG IN MAKING THE FACTUAL CONCLUSION
THAT GITTINS AFFIDAVIT WAS BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
In ^f 10 of its memorandum decision, this court states:
In her affida\>it, Gittins identifies herself as the office manager and the custodian
of records for the service provider (Emphasis added).

2. It appears that in order to justify its improper conclusion that $55.00 difference is due
to finance charges on the $572.00, the court only included the finance charges on page
one of the Ledger and chose to ignore the finance charges on page two of the Ledger.
-3-

However, in her affidavit, Gittins states:
/ am the officer manager of Interwest Anesthesia, a client of Superior Recovevery
Inc. ("Superior"), which means I have access to all account information
regarding James Pett's (the "Defendant") account, and I am a custodian of the
records." (Emphasis added).
Gittins goes on to say:
The records of the Defendant Js account that I reviewed are kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business procedure, and it our regular practice to make
memorandums, reports, records or data compilations. (Emphasis added).
However, Gittins does not state that she created any of the entries in Mr. Pett's
Ledger or that she was even present at the time any of the entries contained in Mr. Pett's
Ledger were allegedly made. Gittins does not state that the entries on the Ledger were
made on or near the time the events on the Ledger allegedly occurred. Furthermore,
Gittins does not specify during what time period she has been "the officer manager for
Interwest, "what period of time she has been " a custodian of the records, " or if she was
even employed at Interwest when the entries to Mr. Pett's Ledger were made.
Additionally, Gittins' affidavit does not specify which statements in her affidavit
were allegedly made from personal knowledge or memory and which statements were
based on her review of Mr. Pett's Ledger. " Therefore, Gittins has not established that she
is competent to testify from personal knowledge or memory concerning any of the entries
contained in Mr. Pett's Ledger, and this court was wrong in making a factual finding to
wit:

Gittins statements provided in her affidavit are therefore, made on "personal
knowledge " and set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence " in accordance
with rule 56(e). "
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This court is not permitted to make factual findings on an appeal from a grant of
summary judgment.3 This court is only permitted, after considering all evidence in a light
most favorable to the losing party, and to drawing all reasonable inferences from that
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, i.e., Mr. Pert, to determine if the
district court was correct in finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact
present in this case and if, as a matter of law, Superior was entitled to summary judgment.
This court did not do that.
C. THE COURT WAS WRONG IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. PETT'S
LEDGER IS A BUSINESS RECORD.
This court was also wrong making the factual finding to wit:
Further, to the extent that Gittins 's affidavit relies on the service provider's
records, those records constitute business records and are not inadmissible
hearsay under the circumstances.
Under the facts of this case, it is factually and legally impossible to conclude that
Mr. Pett's Ledger is a business record, that is exempt from the hearsay provisions of Rule
801 URE.
For evidence to be admissible as a business record, a proper foundation must be
laid to establish the necessary indicia of reliability. That foundation should
generally include the following: (1) the record must be made in the regular course

3. The trial court did not make any factual finding that Gittins' affidavit was "made on
"personal knowledge " and set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence " in
accordance with rule 56(e), " And the trial court did not conclude that there was no
dispute as to whether or not Gittins' affidavit was "made on "personal knowledge " and
set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence. " Therefore, as a matter of law, this
court could not review that conclusion for correctness. Ergo, this court's conclusion that
Gittin's affidavit was "made on "personal knowledge" and set forth facts as would be
admissible in evidence " in accordance with rule 56(e), " is an improper factual finding
this court has made and not a review of the trial court's decision.
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of the business or entity which keeps the records; (2) the record must have been
made at the time of or in close proximity to. the occurrence of the act, condition
or event recorded: (3) the evidence must support a conclusion that after
recordation the document was kept under circumstances that would preserve its
integrity; and (4) the sources of the information from which the entry was made
and the circumstances of the preparation of the document were such as to indicate
its trustworthiness. (Emphasis added).
State v. BertuL 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983).
Not only is it indisputable that many of the entries on Mr. Pett's Ledger were not
made "in close proximity to, the occurrence of the act, condition or event recorded, " the
circumstances of the Ledger's preparation indicate a complete lack of tmslworthiness.4
The entries on the Ledger are not in chronological order. Therefore, as a matter of fact,
the entries could not have been "made at or near the time" of the "Ledger's' "creation as
required by Rule 803(6) URE.5
4. The Ledger is at best a summary, referencing other documents that are not documents
Interwest would keep as a part of Mr. Pett's account, and the Ledger was prepared strictly
for this case, as the name "Patient Ledger Analysis " indicates. The entry dated 7/27/2005
stating: l ALTIUS PAID YOU $514,80 ON 1/25/05. PAYMENT IN FULL IS DUE
IMMEDIATELY ALTIUS IS RETRACTING THE PAYMENT MADE TO US. PLEASE
CONTACT US IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS THANK YOUR!" is not an entry any
business would make in the payment history of an account, and it is based on
inadmissible hearsay. Whoever, made that entry has no personal knowledge as to
whether or not Altius ever paid Mr. Pett any amount, on 2/25/2005 or any other date, and
if the person who made that entry relied on some other document or oral conversation in
making the 7/27/2005 entry, both the document and the conversation are hearsay, and the
7/27/2005 entry is hearsay also. THerefore, Gittins could not rely on it in making her
affidavit, which she admits she did in her affidavit.
5. In pertinent part, Rule 803(6) provides:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or
near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all
as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, ... unless the
-6-

The entries on page 1 of the Ledger are chronological order, from 5/27/2004
through 9/1/2005. However, on page 2 of the Ledger, " the entries change to 6/10/2004,
7/12/2004, 9/1/2004, 10/1/2004, and the final entry is 11/2005. It is, therefore,
indisputable that the Ledger "was "made at or near the time" of those entries.
No logical person can possibly conclude that the entries of 6/10/2004, 7/12/2004,
9/1/2004, and 10/1/2004, made on the Ledger after the entry of 9/1/2005, were "made at
or near the time" the events of 6/10/2004, 7/12/2004, 9/1/2004, and 10/1/2004 allegedly
occurred. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Ledger cannot be construed to be a business
record under the provisions of Rule 803(6) URE, and the Ledger is inadmissible hearsay,
as a matter of law.
Because the circumstances of the Ledger's citation" indicate lack of
trustworthiness, "the Ledger cannot be construed as a business record under Rule 803(6)
URE, and this court was clearly wrong in concluding the Ledger is a business record.
Furthermore, because the Ledger is not a business record, Gittins could not rely on it in
making her affidavit.
D. THIS COURT WAS WRONG IN MAKING ITS FACTUAL CONCLUSION
THAT THE TRIAL COURT FOUND IT WAS UNDISPUTED THAT $318
WAS ADDED TO MR. PETT'S ACCOUNT AS COLLECTION COSTS.
In ^ 4 of its decision, the court also makes the following improper and incorrect
finding of fact:

source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworth in ess. (Emphasis added).
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However, as the district court correctly noted in its order granting summary
judgment, there was no dispute that the $318 was attributable to collection costs
incurred and was added to Pett 's account balance when the service provider
referred the account to Superior for collection on November 1, 2005.
Not only is that factual finding improper, it is incorrect.6 There was a vigorous dispute as
to the purpose of the $317.57 entry on Mr. Pett's Ledger, and Superior's own documents
create a dispute as to what the $317.57 entry on the Ledger represents.
The Ledger starts with a "Charge Balance" of $635.14, on May 27, 2004, and it
ends with a "Charge Balance" of $317.57 on November 1, 2005. Superior cannot
possibly logically and'honestly claim that it added a collection charge of $635.14, on
May 27, 2004, to Mr. Pett's account "to make sure that Interwest Anaesthesia is made
whole. " However, in her affidavit Gittins falsely claims that the "Charge Balance" of
$317.57 was added to Mr. Pett's Ledger on November 1, 2005 "to make sure that
Interwesl Anaesthesia is made whole. "
Interwest had already added a "Charge Balance" of $635.14 to Mr. Pett's account
on May 27, 2004. Why would it need to add another "Charge Balance" of $317.57 to

6. Nowhere in either its first or second memorandum decision or in the Findings,
Order and Judgment does the trial court state, suggest or even imply that"there was no
dispute that the $318 was attributable to collection costs incurred and was added to
Pett's account balance when the service provider referred the account to Superior for
collection on November 7, 2005" (Record 94-95). This court is inserting its improper
and incorrect factual conclusions into the trial court's first memorandum decision, the
second memorandum decision or in the Findings, Order and Judgment, when no such
conclusions, by the trial court, are contained in those documents. Again, this court is not
entitled to make factual findings on appeal. Nor is this court entitled to insert its own
erroneous conclusions into the trial court's documents, after the fact. This court is only
entitled to review the correctness of the trial court's grant of summary judgment. This
court cannot insert conclusions in the trial court's documents that were never made by the
trial court and then say that those conclusions, that were never made, are correct.
-8-

Mr. Pett's account on November 1, 2005, in order "to make sure that Interwest
Anaesthesia is made whole? "
If the "Charge Balance" of $317.57, to Mr. Pett's account on November 1, 2005,
was made in order "to make sure that Interwest Anaesthesia is made whole, " as Superior
and Gittins claim, then the "Charge Balance"of $635.14, made to Mr. Pett's account on
May 27, 2004, must also be an amount added to Mr. Pett's account in order "to make
sure that Interwest Anaesthesia is made whole." They are the exact same entry. Just the
dates and amounts are different. If one is a charge added to Mr. Pett's account, "to make
sure that Interwest Anaesthesia is made whole" then the other must be also. However,
given the fact that Interwest had already added the "Charge Balance"of $635.14 to Mr.
Pett's account, in order to make Interwest whole, why did Interwest not transfer
the "Charge Balance"of $635.14 to Superior for collection? Why did Interwest transfer a
lower amount of $317.57 to Mr. Pett's account on November 1, 2005, why not $635.14?
The truth is that the $317.57 ending balance on Mr. Pett's Ledger is the amount of
his alleged bill, represented on his Ledger, that Interwest assigned to Superior for
collection, not any additional collection charge added to Mr. Pett's account "to make sure
that Interwest Anaesthesia is made whole." The assertion that Interwest added $317.57 to
Mr. Pett's account "to make sure that Interwest Anaesthesia is made whole" is illogical
at best. No reasonable person or entity would arbitrarily choose $317.57 as an amount to
add as collection costs to an account.
However, even assuming, arguendo, that Interwest had some logical reason for
choosing the amount of $317.57, the fact that it used identical entry for the alleged
-9-

addition for collection costs on November 1, 2005 as it used when it made the first entry
on Mr. Pett's Ledger, undeniably creates an issue of fact as to what the "Charge
Balance" of $317.57 to Mr. Pett's account on November 1, 2005 really was. Therefore,
this court could not make the improper factual conclusion that "there was no dispute that
the $318 was attributable to collection costs, " especially when the trial court made no
such finding, contrary to this court's assertion.
E. THE COURT IS WRONG IN ITS ASSERTION THAT THE AMOUNT MR.
PETT ALLEGEDLY OWES INTERWEST IS A PERIPHERAL ISSUE.
In ^f 6 of its memorandum decision, the court states that "principal amount owedn
is a "peripheral issue. " That statement is unbelievable and incomprehensible, to say the
least. If the amount a defendant allegedly owes a plaintiff is a peripheral issue, what is a
core issue?
Is this court really stating that it does not matter how much a defendant allegedly
owes a plaintiff, so long as the defendant owes the plaintiff something, and if there is a
dispute as to how much is owed, the amount owed is irrelevant, just so long as some
amount is owed? Is the court saying a plaintiff does not have the burden of proving how
much it is owed but can just claim any amount and the defendant has to prove the amount
claimed by the plaintiff is incorrect?
If there is an issue to the amount of a debt that is owed, even if it is admitted that
the debt is owed, a court is not entitled to just say, well it doesn't make any difference
how much is owed, just so long as something is owed and then award whatever amount is
asked for by a plaintiff, as the trial court did in this case and as this court has done on
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appeal.
F. THIS COURT WAS WRONG IN CONCLUDING THAT SUPERIOR AND/OR
INTERWEST PROVED THAT ALTIUS "RETRACTED9ANY PAYMENT TO
INTERWEST,
In its memorandum decision this court states:
Superior provided affidavit evidence that Pett's insurer "retracted" a payment on
Pett's account because of a direct payment by the insurer to Pett. thereby leaving
him with a greater balance Pett's affidavit counters that he never received a direct
payment from his insurer. While Pett's affidavit may raise an inference that the
insurer's retraction of payment on his account was improper or that Pett may be
owed money by his insurer, it does nothing to counter Superior's factual assertion
that the payment was, in fact retracted. (Emphasis added).
That assertion is simply mind-boggling. The court is requiring Mr. Pett to prove a
negative, i.e., that Altius never "retracted" the payment to Interwest, something Mr. Pett
can never do.7 One cannot prove a negative.

7. Because, both Interwest and Superior claimed Altius only "retracted" the payment to
Interwest because Altius paid Mr. Pett directly for the services and supplies provided on
his behalf, and because Mr. Pett disputed that Altius paid him any amount for the
services, provided by Interewest, the burden of proof then shifted back to Superior and
Interwest to prove in fact that Altius had "retracted" the payment, both Interwest and
Superior admit Altius made to Interwest. If, in fact, Altius "retracted" the payment to
Interwest, both Superior and Interwest could have proven that Altius did so, but neither
Superior or Interwest did so, or even attempted to do so. (Record at 57-66).
In fact, rather than attempting to provide any evidence that Altius "retracted" the
payment to Interwest, Superior changed its story to contradict Gittin's affidavit and
claimed that Altius had not "retracted" the payment, but rather claimed: "that a refund
check was sent to Altius on or about July 31, 2005, because as Superior claimed: "Is it
that unusual of a concept that if Interwest did not send a refund check to Altius that
Altius would off-set the amount on another account " (Record at 62).
Superior then goes on to admit: "The Plaintiff is unable to fully respond to the
argument that "There is no evidence that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier ever withdrew
payment the plaintiff admits it made to Interwest. Superior has thus admitted that it
cannot meet its burden of proof to provide evidence that Altius ever "retracted" the
.11-

Superior, as the plaintiff in this case had the burden of proof on each element of its
case. Mr. Pett did not have the burden to disprove Superior's claims.8
If this court is going to make a factual finding that Altius "retracted" the payment,
both Interwest and Superior admit Altius made, more than a year after Superior and
Interwest admit that Altius made the payment, this court has to explain the basis of that
factual finding. The mere fact that someone claims something happened does not make
the claim true, even if the claim is made in an affidavit. When a claim is factual and
legally illogical, if not outright impossible, a mere assertion of the claim does not make
the claim true, even if the claim is made in an affidavit.
Unless this court, the trial court, Superior, or Interwest can explain how Altius
actually and legally was able to "retract" a payment Altius made to Interwest 348 days
earlier, neither this court nor the trial court can make a factual conclusion that Altius
"retracted" the payment, especially when the only alleged evidence of the alleged
"retraction" is Gittins' affidavit based on the Ledger, that is inadmissible hearsay and
payment Altius made to Interwest. (Record at 62).
8. 'Where the moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial the movant must
establish each element of his claim in order to show that he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. In order to meet his initial burden on summary judgment. " 2008 UTSC
20061094 - 011508; Orvis v. Johnson. In this matter, Superior had the burden to prove
that the payment from Altius to Interwest had been "retracted," not to just allege it had
been "retracted". Gittins' assertion that Altius' payment to Interwest had been "retracted"
is not proof, especially when that assertion is based on the claim that Altius only
"retracted" the payment because Altius made a payment Mr. Pett and when Mr. Pett
stated under oath that he never received any payment from Altius. Gittin's unsupported
claim that Altius "retracted" the payment to Altius does not meet Superior's burden of
proof to establish that Altius did in fact "retract" the payment to Interwest, when as
practical and legal matter it would be virtually impossible for Altius to "retract" the
payment to Interwest 384 days after the payment was made.
-12-

based on a summary document, that was created just for purposes of this litigation.
Furthermore, Superior, Interwest and this court all state that the payment was
allegedly "retracted" because Altius allegedly paid Mr. Pett the sum of $514.80 on
February 2, 2005. The only reason Interwest and Superior claim that Altius allegedly
made the retraction of the payment is that Altius allegedly paid Mr. Pett the sum of
$514.80 on February 2, 2005.
However, if Altius never paid Mr. Pett $514.80 on February 2, 2005, as Mr. Pett
has stated in his affidavit, there was no logical reason why Altius would retract any
payment to Interwest. The mere fact that Superior, Interwest and this court all state that
Altius allegedly "retracted" the payment to Interwest only because Altius allegedly paid
Mr. Pett $514.80 on February 2, 2005 and Mr. Pett states, under oath, that he never
received any direct payment from Altius, creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether or
not Altius ever "retracted" any payment to Interwest, and that issue of fact precluded the
trial court from entering summary judgment and it precluded this court from affirming the
trial court's grant of summary judgment.
Both this court and the trial court were precluded from making a factual finding
that Altius "retracted" its payment to Interwest based on Superior's own memoranda. In
its initial memoranda, Superior's counsel stated that:
However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31. 2005. because on or about
February 25. 2005. Altius paid the Defendant $514.80. to pay for the services and
supplies provided by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant ys daughter on or about
May 27, 2004. (Emphasis added).
However, Interwest, Superior and this court cannot explain how Altius could "retract" a
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payment it made to Interwest 384 days earlier, and Superior even admits that: "The
Plaintiff is unable to fully respond to the argument that "There is no evidence that Mr.
Pett's insurance carrier ever withdrew payment the plaintiff admits it made to Interwest
(Footnote 8). And, the trial court also admits in its second memorandum decision that
neither Interwest nor Superior can explain how Altius was able to "retract" the previous
payment it made to Interwest on Mr. Pett's behalf. (Record 102-103).
If this court is going to make the improper and incorrect factual conclusion that:
Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about February 25,
2005, Altius paid the Defendant $514.80, to pay for the services and supplies
provided by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant }s daughter on or about May 27,
2004.
This court must explain how it was legally and factually possible for Altius to "retract"
the previous payment it made to Interwest on Mr. Pett's behalf, some 384 days earlier. If
this court cannot do that, and it cannot, it cannot justify its improper and unsupported
conclusion that:
Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about February 25,
2005, Altius paid the Defendant $514.80, to pay for the services and supplies
provided by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27,
2004.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
This court failed to adhere to the proper standard for review of a summary
judgment motion when issuing its memorandum decision. This court improperly viewed
all facts of this case in the light most favorable to Superior. This court also drew all
inferences from the facts in favor of Superior. This court also made factual findings of its
own and imputed factual findings into the trial court's memorandum and order and then
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sustained those findings and conclusions, when the trial court made no such factual
findings or conclusions. This court is required to view all facts in the light most
favorable to Mr. Pett and to draw all inferences from those facts in favor of Mr. Pett.
This court is also specifically prohibited from making factual findings or rewriting the
memoranda and orders of the trial court. Therefore, Mr. Pett is entitled to have this court
re-examine its memorandum decision and issue a proper decision in conformity with the
appropriate standard of review for a grant of summary judgment before an appeal court.9

Dated this 30th day of June 2008.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett

10. This court is correct in its assertions that there is no dispute Interwest provided
medical services and/or supplies, on behalf of Mr. Pett. And the court may even be
correct that Mr. Pett may still owe Interwest some amount for those medical services
and/or supplies. However, there is genuine issue of fact as to how much, if any, he may
owe Interwest, and that genuine issue of fact precluded the trial court from entering
summary judgment against him, and it precludes this court from affirming the trial court's
grant of summary judgment against him.
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CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH FILING
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 URAP, the undersigned Charles A.
Schultz hereby certifies that he isfilingthis Petition for a Rehearing in good faith,
for the purpose of protecting Mr. Pett's rights and in an attempt to explain to the
court how and why Mr. Pett believes the court erred, in both factual and legal ways,
in issuing its memorandum decision in this matter. Mr. Schultz further certifies that
this Petition is not beingfiledfor the purpose of delay.
Dated this 30th day of June 2008.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of June 2008,1 served two true and
correct copes of the Petition for Re-Hearing to the person(s) at the address(es)
below, by depositing a copy(s) in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed
as follows:

Jonathan P. Thomas
31 Federal Ave.
Logan, UT 84321

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett
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